INTRO (BULL ET AL.)_FINAL_1-14 (DO NOT DELETE)

1/24/2016 11:32 AM
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I
INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF IRC AND MEGA-REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS
International regulatory cooperation (IRC) has become a hot topic in recent
years. President Obama has issued an executive order to prompt federal
agencies to engage in IRC under oversight by the Office of Management and
1
Budget and has championed two highly important new IRC initiatives: the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP). These initiatives respond to basic global trends that pose
fresh opportunities and challenges for domestic regulation and for IRC. These
include the persistence, notwithstanding relatively low tariff levels, of behindthe-border regulatory and other impediments to trade and investment;
controversy over whether these differences in national regulations are justified
by differing national preferences or are unwarranted obstacles; unrealized
opportunities to promote global integration of services and other sectors
through global supply chains; relatively sluggish growth in Organization for
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Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, especially in the
European Union (EU) and Japan; the dramatic economic and geopolitical rise
of China and other emerging economies; the emergence of the United States as
a global energy powerhouse; and Russia’s challenges to the EU.
In furthering economic goals by addressing regulatory barriers to
international commerce, IRC must operate in the context of changing
international power balances and geopolitical concerns. Its advocates must also
consider whether and how to strengthen regulatory programs to deal with the
adverse side effects of heightened economic growth, including environmental
and social externalities and deprivations visited on vulnerable and poorly
organized groups.
This symposium addresses IRC in the context of cooperative arrangements
between public authorities, including states, government regulators, and
international organizations; it does not directly address the rapidly growing field
of private and hybrid public–private global regulation, although such private
2
standards may be invoked by public authorities. At the forefront of new
intergovernmental strategies for IRC are TTIP, composed by the United States
and the EU, and TPP, developed by twelve Pacific Rim countries including the
3
United States and Japan. These proposed mega-regional agreements not only
aim to further reduce tariffs (in the case of TPP, to zero) and other border
measures that impede trade, but they also contain ambitious arrangements for
regulatory cooperation to address trade barriers created by divergent regulatory
measures and approaches for goods and services; deal with other structural
barriers such as those created by government procurement policies and stateowned enterprises; address global supply chains, e-commerce, competition
policy, transparency, and anti-corruption; and enhance protection for
investment and intellectual property. The regimes’ wide range of subjects and
their ambitious scope justify the label “mega-regional.” The recent grant in July
2015 by the U.S. Congress of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA, often dubbed
“fast track”) to President Obama has given fresh impetus to both the TPP and
TTIP negotiations, which could well be concluded in 2016. Meanwhile, several
4
other mega-regional agreements are being generated in the Asia-Pacific region.
This article is organized as follows: Part II discusses the drivers motivating
2. See TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF
REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011); BENEDICT KINGSBURY & RICHARD B. STEWART,
GLOBAL PRIVATE AND HYBRID GLOBAL REGULATION (forthcoming 2016).
3. Other participating countries are Canada, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia,
Singapore, Vietnam, Chile, Peru, and Brunei. New Zealand Ministry of Affairs & Trade, Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) Negotiations, http://mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/2-Trade-Relat
ionships-and-Agreements/Trans-Pacific/index.php.
4. These include the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, comprised of the ASEAN
members and Japan, China, Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand as well as a Japan–China–Korea
Trilateral Free Trade Agreement. See, e.g., Junji Nakagawa, Sub-Regional Issues of Plurilateral FTAs:
Global Supply Chains and FTAs in East Asia and the Pacific, 8 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 439, 457 (2013) (discussing the need for mega-regional regimes to support the development and
enhance the performance of global supply chains).
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IRC and the challenges facing IRC. Part III addresses the various institutional
structures and techniques for IRC. IRC governance issues and concerns are
addressed in part IV. Innovations to overcome obstacles to IRC are discussed in
part V. The individual articles contributing to this issue are discussed where
they pertain to the subjects addressed in each of these parts.
II
NOVEL CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IRC
A. IRC Drivers
TTIP and TPP, as well as the other new initiatives for IRC examined in this
symposium, respond to three powerful drivers.
The first driver is mutual economic benefit through liberalized trade and
investment. Reducing regulatory and other barriers promises more competitive
markets, lower prices, broader diffusion of innovations, and enhanced
consumer welfare, as well as other benefits from liberalization of countries’
domestic economies and regulatory governance structures. Government
pronouncements and the media have focused on the economic gains, the
magnitude of which has been hotly contested.
5
A second driver for the new IRC initiatives is strategic. TTIP has been
6
dubbed an “Economic NATO.” TTIP and TPP together account for two-thirds
of world trade, putting the United States in a position to exercise considerable
leverage. If TTIP succeeds in promoting a high degree of EU–U.S. regulatory
convergence, its regulatory measures and approaches, and its investment and
intellectual property arrangements, could, through a variety of mechanisms,
become the de facto global standards, restoring in part the past European and
American primacy in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other
multilateral bodies. At the same time, the rise of mega-regional trade zones
could diminish the role of the WTO and undermine multilateralism. Through
TPP, the United States and Japan seek to enlist other Pacific Rim countries in
economic integration and governance reform to counter China as well as to
7
promote their respective economic objectives. The Abe Administration in
5. See Daniel Hamilton & Stephen Blockmans, The Geostrategic Implications of TTIP, CENTRE
EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES AND CENTER FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS (Apr. 20, 2015),
http://www.ceps.eu/publications/geostrategic-implications-ttip (hereinafter Geostrategic Implications of
TTIP).
6. C. Boyden Gray, Issue Brief for Atlantic Council Global Business and Economics Program,
An Economic NATO: A New Alliance for a New Global Order, (Feb. 21, 2013),
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/an-economic-nato-a-new-alliance-for-a-newglobal-order.
7. China has exhibited an ambivalent attitude and strategy toward TPP. See Ming Du, Explaining
China’s Tripartite Strategy towards the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 10 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 18,
417 (May 2015) (addressing “why China changed its initial suspicious attitude to a more neutral stance
toward the TPP . . . the short-term and long-term effects of the TPP on China’s economic growth and
geopolitical influence . . . [and] the myriad of challenges posed by the TPP [for China] moving
forward”).
FOR
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Japan and many in the EU also see mega-regional regulatory cooperation as a
wedge to break up entrenched domestic political economic and bureaucratic
interests within their own jurisdictions, emulating China’s strategy in joining the
WTO.
A third driver of IRC is strengthening the capacity of states to deliver
effective regulatory protection to their citizens. As IRC generates more
transborder economic activity and associated gains in prosperity, it may also
generate greater adverse effects from uncorrected market failures operating on
a broader scale. Additionally, global economic integration, technological
changes, and the rise of global supply chains undermine the ability of states to
act unilaterally to protect their citizens. Intergovernmental cooperation is
needed to fill growing regulatory gaps resulting from intensifying global
economic integration, whether in financial markets, food and pharmaceutical
safety, environmental protection, public health, or international security. In
these circumstances, regulatory failures in some jurisdictions spill over into
others. As a result, domestic regulators who would generally prefer not to cede
or share authority with counterparts from other countries may be forced or
persuaded to do so in order to carry out their missions.
IRC is needed for effective regulatory implementation and enforcement
when goods and services, such as pharmaceuticals, food, automobiles, banking,
air travel, and others, cross borders through global supply chains. Adoption of
equivalent regulatory measures promises to reduce “leakage” of investment to
jurisdictions with laxer regulatory standards and to address competitiveness
concerns. The environmental and labor provisions in TPP, which are designed
to strengthen regulatory programs in (developing) country parties, reflect this
objective and also respond to concerns of developed country environmental
groups and organized labor.
In addition to strengthening regulatory programs, IRC can economize
scarce regulatory resources by sharing the burden among regulators of multiple
trading partners. Successful regulatory cooperation achieves economies of scale
and cost sharing in gathering information and performing analyses. IRC can
also promote collaborative learning regarding best regulatory practices and
decisional processes. Further, as national regulators must increasingly confront
the consequences of their regulatory decisions for other jurisdictions and of
others’ regulatory decisions for one’s own jurisdiction, IRC may ultimately
promote greater mutual regard for the welfare of others’ citizens.
B. Confronting the Challenges of IRC
8

Many of the contributions in this issue, including those by C. Boyden Gray,
9
10
11
Reeve Bull, Fernanda Nicola, Anne Meuwese, Jonathan Wiener and Alberto
8. C. Boyden Gray, Upgrading Existing Regulatory Mechanisms for Transatlantic Regulatory
Cooperation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015.
9. Reeve T. Bull, Developing a Domestic Framework for International Regulatory Cooperation,
78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015.

INTRO (BULL ET AL.)_FINAL_1-14 (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2015]

1/24/2016 11:32 AM

NEW APPROACHES TO IRC
12

5

13

Alemanno, and Robert Howse discuss IRC issues in the context of the TTIP
and TPP mega-regionals. Building on first-generation initiatives such as
Mercosur (discussed in the contribution by Marian Moto Prado and Vladimir
14
Bertrand ) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), TTIP
and TPP set a high level of ambition and embody innovative institutional
structures to achieve these ambitions. TTIP and TPP are framed as “living
agreements,” creating a standing joint regulatory coordinating body (RCB) that
will engage high-level political officials with the aim of spurring continual
initiatives to reduce regulation-based trade barriers over time in a variety of
regulatory sectors. Recognizing the difficulties in achieving convergence on
substantive regulatory measures, TTIP and TPP also seek, under the banner of
“regulatory coherence” or “regulatory integration,” to promote cross-sector
cooperation on regulatory decision-making processes, including intensive
consultation, information sharing, risk-assessment procedures, regulatoryimpact-assessment procedures, public participation, mutual learning from best
practices, and joint review and analysis of the performance of regulatory
15
measures and strategies.
Another innovative form of IRC, addressed in Jeffrey Dunoff’s
contribution, is regulatory cooperation among international regulatory
16
organizations. Other contributions deal with more general issues in IRC.
Robert Ahdieh’s article applies game theoretic analysis of the potential for
regulatory cooperation notwithstanding conflicting interests among
17
jurisdictions. Wiener and Alemanno discuss the considerable potential for
18
learning from regulatory differences rather than striving only for uniformity.
Francesca Bignami and Giorgio Resta provide a detailed account of EU–U.S.
19
conflict and cooperation in the field of data privacy.
The diverse efforts to advance IRC confront a variety of familiar and

10. Fernanda G. Nicola, The Politicization of Legal Expertise in the TTIP Negotiation, 78 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015.
11. Anne Meuwese, Constitutional Aspects of Regulatory Coherence in TTIP: An EU Perspective,
78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015.
12. Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International Regulatory
Cooperation: TTIP as a Learning Process toward a Global Policy Laboratory, 78 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 4, 2015.
13. Robert Howse, Regulatory Cooperation, Regional Trade Agreements, and World Trade Law:
Conflict or Complementarity?, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015.
14. Mariana Mota Prado & Vladimir Bertrand, Regulatory Cooperation in Latin America: The
Case of Mercosur, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015.
15. See, e.g., European Commission, Textual Proposal for Chapter on Regulatory Cooperation in
TTIP, 6–8 (Feb. 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/tradoc_153120.pdf.
16. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Mapping a Hidden World of International Regulatory Cooperation, 78 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015.
17. Robert B. Ahdieh, Coordination and Conflict: The Persistent Relevance of Networks in
International Financial Regulation,78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015.
18. See Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 12 at 132–35.
19. Francesca Bignami & Giorgio Resta, Transatlantic Privacy Regulation: Conflict and
Cooperation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015.
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recurring obstacles. These include differences among participating jurisdictions
in their economic, social, and political circumstances; their existing standards
and modes of regulation (including conformity determinations and
implementation and enforcement arrangements); their regulatory preferences
and cultures; their regulatory decision-making institutions and procedures and
their administrative, constitutional, and legal structures and cultures and
capacities; and the sheer and often inevitable complexity of many regulatory
programs. Many changes in regulatory measures and processes generate
controversy and opposition. Changes involve adjustment costs for regulators,
the regulated, and the public. Domestic interest groups including firms,
workers, and environmental and social-advocacy groups may view proposed
changes as adverse, and may often be more politically influential than those
who will benefit from the change.
Further, regulators tend to resist loss of decisional autonomy and changes in
established ways of regulating. They may well embrace IRC when it advances
their regulatory mission; for example, transnational coordination in antitrust.
But individual agencies and regulators may not see strong incentives in the
prospect of collective global or transnational benefits such as general increases
in economic activity resulting from regulatory cooperation, and they might
accordingly underinvest in IRC. The precise character and extent of these
obstacles varies depending on the sector in question and the configuration of
different interest groups and jurisdictions that stand to gain or lose from
change. Moreover, the costs and benefits of the same regulatory change may
vary across countries. Differences in levels of development, for example among
the TPP countries, may make regulatory convergence more difficult. Even if the
parties have similar levels of development and have already achieved a high
degree of integration, as in the case of TTIP, differences in risk preferences and
long-entrenched regulatory cultures can still create substantial obstacles.
Steps to advance IRC must also confront often-vocal normative challenges
to its governance and the consequences for national regulatory policies. Critics
fear that shifting regulatory decisionmaking to transnational bodies creates a
two-level game that can be used by the executive and well-organized economic
interests to enhance their power, enable them to circumvent domestic
legislative and judicial mechanisms for participation and accountability, and
20
“launder” the regulatory policies that they favor through IRC mechanisms. A
related critique is that the negotiation of mega-regional and other IRC regimes
has been clouded in secrecy, and that transparency and opportunities for civil

20. Barry Steinhardt, Problem of Policy Laundering, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Aug
13, 2004), http://26konferencja.giodo.gov.pl/data/resources/SteinhardtB_paper.pdf.; see also Alvin Y.H.
Cheung, Intra-Executive Regulatory Policy Laundering Through Mega-regional Negotiations, Paper
presentation at ICON-S International Society of Public Law Conference: Public Law in an Uncertain
World (July 2, 2015) (on file with author); Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New
Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV 595, 629
(2007).
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society participation in their decisionmaking is limited at best. Environmental,
health-and-safety, and labor advocates contend that as a consequence, IRC,
especially in the form of mega-regional deals, will lead to a weakening of
regulatory protections—a tendency that they worry is reinforced by
competitiveness pressures and lowest-common-denominator dynamics in IRC
regimes that include developing countries. EU nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and parliamentarians have criticized TTIP on several of these grounds,
and NGOs in the United States, New Zealand, and Australia have similarly
attacked TPP. To meet such criticisms, IRC arrangements can seek to ensure
that jurisdictions with higher standards maintain them, and that the megaregional agreements harmonize standards upward rather than downward. The
environmental and labor provisions in TPP are a response to these criticisms,
seeking to enhance regulatory protections in developing country parties. The
extent to which they can be expected to produce stronger standards and
effective enforcement in developing country parties may nonetheless be
22
modest; many developing countries and their firms tend to view the higher
standards as impositions designed to impair their competitive position.
Some states, certainly weak states, will suffer some loss of decisional
independence or “regulatory sovereignty” as a result of participating in IRC
and adopting the standards that IRC generates. Indeed, powerful jurisdictions
may be able to leverage IRC to secure broad adherence to regulatory measures
and approaches. These may include: cost-benefit analysis, evidence-based
regulation, heightened environmental, health-and-safety and labor standards,
and heightened investment and intellectual property protections. These
measures may advance their constituents’ interests but provoke contestation
and resistance from other states who regard them as adverse. Meanwhile, the
effects of mega-regional agreements may also spill over to states not
participating in IRC that nonetheless face strong incentives to adopt regulatory
standards and approaches adopted by IRC regimes with economic clout, such as
TTIP. The mega-regionals’ regulatory norms may be taken up by international
standard-setting organizations and private transnational codes, become a
condition of development assistance, or represent an off-the-shelf resort for
21. See, e.g., Marija Bartl & Elaine Fahey, A Post National Marketplace: Negotiating the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), in TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNITY OF LAW:
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EU AND US LEGAL ORDERS 210
(Elaine Fahey & Deirdre Curtin eds., 2015); Marika Armanovica & Roberto Bendini, European
Parliament: Directorate-General for External Policies, Civil Society’s Concerns about Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (Oct. 14 2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes
/IDAN/2014/536404/EXPO_IDA(2014)536404_EN.pdf; Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Job Loss,
Lower Wages and Higher Drug Prices, PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/TPP (last visited Nov. 4,
2015).
22. See Ching-Wen Hsueh, A Greener Trade Agreement: Approaches to Environmental Issues in
the TPP Negotiations, 8 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 521 (Sept. 2013); see also Joshua
P. Meltzer, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: The Environment and Climate Change, in TRADE
LIBERALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (Tania Voon ed., 2014) (discussing environmental chapters in the
U.S. FTA).
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states with weak administrative capacity.
IRC must also address decision-making failures that prevent jurisdictions
from agreeing on cooperative measures that would be in their mutual long-term
interests. The hub-and-spoke institutional design and negotiating strategy of
TTIP and TPP, which combine working groups of regulators in various sectors
with a central regulatory coordinating structure, can enhance the chances for
agreement relative to fragmented single-sector approaches followed in the past
by expanding the number and type of regulatory issues in play and by allowing
for cross-issue compromises as well as enlisting high-level political leadership to
push cooperation forward in specific sectors. The regulatory negotiation (“reg23
neg”) procedures discussed by C. Boyden Gray are another response that
could afford opportunities for participation by a broader range of actors beyond
the governments that are officially parties to the IRC regime.
Success in regulatory cooperation should not necessarily be equated with
24
uniformity in regulatory measures. Additionally—as the contributions by Bull
25
and Wiener and Alemanno make clear—differences in regulatory standards
can yield significant advantages, including the ability to tailor measures to local
preferences and to glean important insights from regulatory variation.
Furthermore, there are many productive forms of regulatory cooperation
beyond harmonization of standards, including closer ongoing communication
and information exchange among domestic regulators in specific sectors, crosscutting joint or convergent processes for regulatory assessment and risk
analysis, and cooperation on implementation and enforcement strategies. Over
the long run, these forms of regulatory cooperation, emphasized in TTIP and
TPP in recognition of the obstacles to harmonizing standards, may result in
significant functional convergence in regulatory programs and reduction in
trade barriers.
III
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND TECHNIQUES FOR IRC
A. Structures of IRC
Institutionally, five basic structures of IRC regimes have emerged:
First are free trade agreements (FTAs), which do not themselves set
regulatory standards for goods and services, but include trade disciplines (for
example, tariff reduction, and non-discrimination in regulation) and procedural
requirements (for example, transparency) that apply to domestic regulatory
measures. These disciplines, as in the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade) and the WTO and regional trade agreements such as Mercosur and
NAFTA, may promote negative harmonization (constraining regulatory

23. See Gray, supra note 8, at 41–47.
24. See generally Bull, supra note 9.
25. See generally Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 12.
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differences that impede trade). They may also aid in the process of positive
harmonization (agreement on shared regulatory standards or procedures), as
has occurred in the EU. The WTO, most notably in the Sanitary and
Photosanitary Measures (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT
Agreements), provides specific incentives for development of international
standards and their adoption by members. The WTO also shapes domestic and
26
transnational regulatory governance through broader systemic influences.
A second structure is that of international agreements and organizations
which set regulatory standards in specific sectors; examples include the
Montreal Protocol (ozone-depleting substances), the Basel Committee (capital
adequacy standards for banks), and Codex Alimentarius (food and plant
safety). In addition to official intergovernmental agreements on treaties and
similar international accords among states, these structures may include
transnational governance through private or hybrid public–private codes.
Various forms of bilateral cooperation among domestic regulators are a third
structure that may generate common regulatory standards (but more often
mutual recognition arrangements, sharing of information and best practices,
and ongoing consultation). In some cases such bilateral cooperation occurs
through adoption or incorporation by reference of private and hybrid publicprivate codes.
The fourth structure is represented by mega-regionals, which include trade,
regulatory cooperation and investment, and other measures, and combine
elements of the three IRC structures noted above.
IRC among international organizations (as discussed in the contribution by
27
Jeffrey Dunoff) is the fifth structure. The global allocation of IRC activity
among these institutional forms, part of the emerging field of global
28
organizational ecology, reflects differences in field and the character of the
regulations in issue, the legal and functional attributes of the different regime
types, and considerations of political economy that lead states and other actors
seek to channel IRC to fora in which they enjoy relative advantages of power
and influence.
29
30
Several of the contributions in this issue—those by Gray, Meuwese, and
31
Nicola —focus on TTIP as an FTA combined with mechanisms for ongoing
regulatory cooperation across many sectors. TTIP is a mega-regional (fourth
model), which represents a hybrid of the first model (trade liberalization) and
the third (cooperative bilateral regulation in specific sectors). Other examples
of such hybrids include NAFTA, Mercosur, and TTP. More ambitious than any

26. See generally Gregory C. Shaffer, How the WTO Shapes Regulatory Governance, 9 REG. &
GOVERNANCE, 1 (2015) (providing a framework for assessing the regulatory implications of the WTO).
27. See Dunoff, supra note 16.
28. See TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terrence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015).
29. See Gray, supra note 8.
30. See Meuwese, supra note 11.
31. See Nicola, supra note 10.
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of these other hybrid models, TTIP responds to the failure to reach agreement
on new WTO measures to address nontariff barriers to trade and the limitations
of bilateral or multilateral regulatory regimes limited to particular sectors. TTIP
aims to establish an institutional platform for ongoing regulatory cooperation
across sectors that will not only broaden, but deepen regulatory cooperation.
Recognizing the limits of a strategy that relies on harmonizing hard-law
standards, TTIP envisages coordination of the processes for developing and
implementing regulatory norms. As Nicola observes, TTIP represents an effort
by the EU and the United States to compensate for their loss of hegemonic
domination of the WTO and to meet the challenge of China and other emerging
economies by establishing a new joint regime for regulatory cooperation in
order to stimulate transatlantic economic growth and generate standards that
32
will de facto govern transactions throughout the world. In the process, TTIP
may marginalize other arrangements for international regulatory standardsetting.
B. Techniques for IRC
As a helpful heuristic, it may prove instructive to identify the array of
techniques for IRC as they fall along a continuum—a spectrum ranging from
fully uncoordinated regulatory heterogeneity on one end, to fully uniform
regulatory homogeneity (universal harmonization, or a single global law) on the
other. In the intermediate regions of this spectrum are several approaches that
can be built between decentralized heterogeneity and centralized homogeneity.
The five structures outlined above in part III.A may each employ one or more
33
techniques across this spectrum. An OECD “stocktaking” paper identifies
eleven types of IRC mechanisms amid a complex web of actors, epistemic
networks, law, and norms, which are not mutually exclusive. Other options may
also be identified. Drawing on these eleven types, and alluding to the different
structures that may employ them, yields the following identification of key
techniques for IRC along the spectrum from regulatory heterogeneity to
regulatory homogeneity or convergence: for each of these techniques, the
structure involved may be bilateral, regional, multilateral; among international
organizations; or among private actors such as businesses, advocacy groups, and
individuals.
1. Fully uncoordinated regulatory heterogeneity.

32. See id. at 1 (explaining how the EU–U.S. pursuit of the TIPP and TPP partnerships aimed to
generate robust “economic growth while [simultaneously] strengthening the Western bloc to contain
the rising Chinese power and the regulatory challenges posed by the expansion of the Chinese
markets.”).
33. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CO-OPERATION:
RULES FOR A GLOBAL WORLD 8–10 (Oct. 14, 2012), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=GOV/RPC(2012)8/REV1&docLanguage=En (offering a typology of
eleven IRC mechanisms); see also ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY CO-OPERATION: ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES 19–74 (2013) (discussing types
of transnational relations in IRC).
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2. Dialogue: informal exchange of information and personnel exchanges to
foster mutual understanding of each other’s regulations, such as the
Transatlantic Economic Council.
3. Procedural soft law: cooperation among states based on non-legally
binding instruments that enable interested parties from other countries to
participate in regulatory rulemaking, including through notice and comment,
stakeholder input, and access to information, such as the OECD Guidelines and
Principles. Grays’s contribution suggests transnational regulatory negotiation
(“reg-neg”) as one promising approach.
4. Private codes: Coordinated technical standards adopted by multinational
private standards development organizations, such as transnational industry
associations, or the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).
5. Intergovernmental reliance on private codes: The incorporation of
international private codes into national legislative instruments by means of a
reference to one or more standards, such as reference to ISO standards, or
agreement on common testing protocols, such as those for automobiles.
6. Transgovernmental networks: cooperation among agencies or units of
national governments, based on peer-to-peer ties developed through frequent
interaction rather than formal negotiation of agreements. Examples include the
International Competition Network and the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision. These could also involve diffusion of similar regulatory approaches
across separate national regulatory bodies, such as through learning or
emulation. Coordinated, or joint, regulatory impact assessments, for individual
rulemakings or for multiple policies, ex ante or ex post, may contribute to such
34
diffusion and learning, as discussed in the contributions by Bull and by Wiener
35
and Alemanno.
7. Mutual recognition agreements in national regulatory law: retaining
different national standards, but agreeing to allow market access upon approval
by the other jurisdictions’ regulatory authority.
8. International agreements: multilateral accords to reduce regulatory
barriers to trade, as in NAFTA and the WTO.
9. Membership in international organizations promoting regulatory
cooperation: such as the International Labor Organization, OECD, and AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation. Cooperation among international organizations
36
(as discussed in the contribution by Jeffrey Dunoff) is a strong form of this
technique.
10. Formal regulatory partnerships between countries: such as the U.S.–
Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council, the Mexico–U.S. High Level
Regulatory Cooperation Council, the EU–U.S. High Level Regulatory
Cooperation Forum (on oversight and impact assessment structures), or the

34. Bull, supra note 9.
35. Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 12.
36 . Dunoff, supra note 16.
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Trans-Tasman cooperation arrangements between Australia and New Zealand.
11. Integration and harmonization through a given supranational or joint
institution: agreement to adopt the same regulatory standard in each national
regulation. These include bilateral or multilateral accords to adopt the same
regulatory standard in each state party, such as international treaties on
environment, health, and safety. EU legislation and U.S. federal legislation
applied through member states are strong versions of this (as discussed in the
37
contribution by Meuwese).
12. Joint regulator: The creation of a single regulatory agency or body to
promulgate joint regulations with the same standard covering two or more
jurisdictions. A leading example is the joint Food Standards Australia and New
Zealand (FSANZ).
13. A single global regulatory law.
IV
IRC GOVERNANCE ISSUES AND ANXIETIES
The governance issues associated with intergovernmental regulatory
cooperation fall along three dimensions: horizontal structures and procedures
for IRC decisionmaking; vertical relations between IRC decisional processes
and their regulatory outputs and domestic regulatory structures, decisional
processes, and measures; and external impacts of IRC regimes on their relations
with jurisdictions that are not members of the cooperation regime. The
interplay among these dimensions ultimately determines the consequences of
the IRC enterprise for the welfare and concerns of diverse individuals in many
jurisdictions.
A. The Horizontal Dimension; Decision-making Structures and Processes for
IRC Regimes
As regards the horizontal dimension, precisely which governmental officials
38
participate and make decisions differs in each of the five types of structures.
The officials are primarily trade officials and negotiators in the first type,
officials from specific regulatory agencies in the second and third types, and a
combination of these along with senior executive officials in the fourth type. In
the fifth type international bureaucrats play a decisive role. FTAs, megaregionals, and international regulatory organizations are established by treaty
and have relatively formalized structures and procedures. Intergovernmental
networks vary in degree of legalization. Many arrangements and processes for
bilateral cooperation are highly informal, although in some cases they operate
under memoranda of agreement between the respective government agencies.
The decision-making arrangements must promote participants’ agreement

37. Meuwese, supra note 11.
38. See supra Part III.A.
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on measures for regulatory cooperation.
Although the governance
arrangements in decision-making procedures for TTIP and TPP have yet to be
resolved in detail, they will include an institutional platform for ongoing
regulatory cooperation across sectors. In the case of TTIP, it will include an
RCB to establish and oversee implementation of an agenda for specific
initiatives by sectoral working groups of domestic agency officials. The
objective would be to steer efforts toward sectors and issues promising the
greatest progress in agreements with high payoffs in reducing regulatory
barriers. For example, these could include the automotive sector, technical
barriers in engineering and machinery, and certain aspects of chemicals
40
regulation. In the hub-and-spoke design, the central RCB would promote
harmonized cross-sectoral regulatory decision-making processes, including
regulatory impact and risk-assessment processes. It is increasingly recognized
that regulatory cooperation must extend to the mechanisms and procedures for
developing, implementing, and enforcing regulatory measures; Nicola concludes
that the relative lack of success in past efforts at transatlantic regulatory
41
cooperation is due in significant part to neglect of this approach. High-level
officials would oversee the work of the RCB and the enterprise as a whole and
could supply political muscle to push through agreements that sector-specific
regulators might resist or be unable to achieve. An institutional model for an
RCB is the U.S. OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which
under President Obama’s executive order acts as a convening and agendasetting apparatus for IRC initiatives by specific agencies.
Although achieving effective internal agreement is critical, the interests and
concerns of nonstate actors and third-party jurisdictions affected by IRC
decisions must also be considered in the institutional design. TTIP and TPP
governance arrangements have been sharply criticized. Prominent among the
criticisms is secrecy in the process of negotiating the agreements (some parties
have responded with selective disclosure of draft texts) and in their internal
decisional procedures. Nonetheless, the institutional design of these new megaregional bodies, which include a high-level and politically visible coordinating
body and an emphasis on cross-cutting regulatory decision-making processes
that afford opportunity for public input, can provide substantial opportunities
for transparency and participation, which in turn engage nonstate actors and
thereby provide a basis for review by, for example, parliamentary bodies.
Currently, there is often only limited transparency regarding internal IRC

39. This topic is addressed in part IV of this Introduction and a number of the contributions.
40. EU Commission, Detailed Explanation on the EU Proposal for a Chapter on Regulatory
Cooperation, (May 6, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153431.1.1 Detail
explanation of the EU proposal for a Chapter of reg coop.pdf. A comprehensive presentation of the
trade, regulatory, and other issues in play in TTIP is provided by Jeffrey J. Schott & Cathleen Cimino,
Crafting a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: What Can Be Done, PETERSON INST. FOR
INT’L ECON (Mar. 2013), http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb13-8.pdf; Armanovia & Bendini, supra
note 21.
41. See Nicola, supra note 10.
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decisional processes. Though that may be important for securing agreement,
closed decision-making procedures exclude representatives of broader
constituencies with a stake in the outcome. Many sector-based international
regulatory bodies (the second category) have, however, increasingly adopted
global administrative law procedures for transparency and public participation
42
regarding proposed standards and other normative products. Some also give
reasons for the standards and other measures proposed or adopted.
Arrangements for independent review of decisions are generally limited. In
some regimes, “stakeholders” representing business, environmental, and social
interests and concerns have an assigned role in the body’s decision-making
processes to facilitate consultation and input but do not exercise decision43
making power. IRC bodies have adopted such procedures to improve the
quality of their regulatory products, promote their uptake by domestic officials
and other users, and increase their acceptance by broader publics especially
when their regulatory decisions generate significant externalities and
44
distributional consequences. Demands for public governance procedures are
generally absent or muted in the case of international bodies that adopt
technical standards to solve coordination games and informal bilateral IRC
arrangements.
B. The Vertical Dimension: Relation between IRC Regimes and Domestic
Regulatory Governance
The vertical axis of IRC governance concerns the relation between the IRC
institution and domestic legal and political regulatory structures, processes, and
measures. This relation is by no means solely top-down. As in all transnational
regulatory arrangements, there is recursive multilevel interweaving of initiative,
influence, and response in all directions. Apart from some treaty-based
international bodies, the regulatory norms and decisions generated
transnationally through IRC are not legally binding on domestic
administrations; formal regulatory sovereignty is preserved. This is the case
with TTIP and TPP. Nonetheless, IRC norms and decisions often have a
substantial effect on domestic regulatory orders, especially when the relevant
domestic regulatory officials have participated in the IRC decisionmaking that
45
produced them and have statutory authority to adopt them. Domestic political
and legal mechanisms for supervising regulatory agencies and holding them
accountable for their decisions remain in operation. Thus, agency decisions to
implement transnationally agreed-upon measures may be subject to procedural
42. See generally Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of
Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (Autumn 2005).
43. See Michael A. Livermore, Authority and Legitimacy in Global Governance: Deliberation,
Institutional Differentiation, and the Codex Alimentarius, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 766, 782 (2006).
44. See Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance:
Accountability, Participation and Responsiveness, 108 AM J. INT’L L. 211, 220 (2014).
45. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S. Administrative
Law, 37 N.Y.U. INT’L. L. & POL. 695 (2005).
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disciplines such as requirements to prepare regulatory impact analyses and—in
the United States—public notice and opportunity for comment. These
mechanisms’ effectiveness is, however, often substantially diminished when the
basic decisionmaking has already occurred at the transnational level.
As discussed above, these circumstances have fueled both process-based and
substantive critiques of transnational regulatory regimes by environmental,
consumer, labor, and social groups. These criticisms—especially pronounced in
Europe (in the case of TTIP) and in New Zealand and Australia (in the case of
TPP)—apply to many IRC bodies that already exist, such as the WTO, and
have generated widely adopted standards and measures. Because TTIP and
TPP are new, prominent, and more-ambitious regimes, they have attracted
exceptionally sharp criticism but also provide opportunities for institutional and
46
procedural measures to meet the criticisms.
Concerns about regulatory sovereignty and circumvention of domestic
governance arrangements are most acute when IRC bodies generate
harmonized, substantive regulatory requirements. As reflected in the emphasis
in TTIP and TPP on “regulatory coherence,” one response to these concerns is
to focus IRC on less-intrusive regulatory objectives, including cooperation on
regulatory impact analysis (RIA) and risk-assessment processes, and to focus on
intensive consultation and information-sharing.
At the root of the criticisms is the fact that all administrative regulation
involves a delegation of authority, creating attendant principal–agent problems.
In IRC, the delegation is beyond the state. Such delegations can significantly
enhance the regulatory capacity of participating states, but simultaneously
create deeper principal–agent problems that exist in the purely domestic
47
context. One response is to build decision-making mechanisms within the IRC
body, to promote accountability and responsiveness to relevant affected
interests and concerns. These mechanisms can include not only the Global
Administrative Law mechanisms, but others such as RIA, which in its
procedural aspect can provide participation opportunities while in its
substantive aspect can discipline decisionmaking by promoting a more
transparent analysis and a consideration of regulatory alternatives and their
consequences for those affected. The U.S. experience indicates that this
discipline can reduce rent-seeking and promote better quality regulations in the
48
general interest. Applied at the transnational level, the analytic discipline and
information-forcing attributes of RIA may also promote international
49
regulatory integration. The hub-and-spoke structure of TTIP and TPP is well46. See Dan Ciuriak & Harsha Vardhana Singh, Mega-Regionals and the Regulation of Trade:
Implications for Industrial Policy, 6–9 (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2460501.
47. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (refusing to give
legal effect to Montréal Protocol decision to limit U.S. methyl bromide as a fungicide on basis of
purported concerns over delegating lawmaking authority to an international body).
48. John F. Morrall III & James W. Broughel, Regulatory Impact Analysis in Federal Rule Making,
Mercatus Center at George Mason University, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2501096, at 6–8, 28.
49. Rodrigo Polanco, CETA and TTIP 26, paper presented at ICON-S Global Public Law
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suited for development of cross-cutting governance processes to address the
critics’ concerns. Because they are led by powerful Western jurisdictions
committed to liberal values, these mega-regionals are well-positioned to serve
as a laboratory and influence decisional practices in other global regulatory
bodies, even as they face resistance from China and other emerging economies.
Yet some critics worry that procedures for transparency, participation, and
regulatory impact assessment disproportionately advantage business groups or
countries with greater resources to use them. European parliamentarians and
NGOs have branded TTIP transparency provisions as “licenses for businesses
50
to lobby.” Nicola echoes this concern but also, together with Meuwese and
Bignami, offers suggestions for innovative means to build transnational IRC
regimes that are at once effective, accountable, and broadly responsive to
51
interests and concerns that might otherwise be disregarded or marginalized.
A different angle of response to the principal–agent problems associated
with IRC is to extend domestic political and legal controls to the international
level. Legislatures can impose ex ante conditions on the delegation, including
reporting and other procedural requirements, as Congress does through TPA
provisions. Legislatures can monitor the performance of IRC regimes and
threaten action. The U.S. executive and Congress have taken steps to promote
transparency and stakeholder participation in IRC negotiations. There are also
techniques that courts can use to secure more effective judicial review of
standards and other measures generated by IRC regimes and thereafter
52
implemented by domestic agencies.
A further technique for addressing concerns about regulatory sovereignty
and circumvention of domestic governance disciplines is to target IRC not on
common substantive regulatory standards but on less-intrusive measures,
including mutual recognition and cooperation on RIA and risk-assessment
processes, as well as intensive consultation, information sharing, and review and
analysis; this approach is reflected in the emphasis in TTIP and TPP on
“regulatory coherence” as opposed to regulatory harmonization.
A thorough assessment of the governance consequences of IRC, including
mega-regionals, must also take into account the democracy-enhancing potential
53
of transnationally agreed norms for domestic administrative decisionmaking.
Thus, WTO provisions requiring transparency, participation, reason-giving, and
review for domestic administrations have served to enhance the quality and
54
promote accountability of their regulatory decisionmaking. TPP is expected to
Conference at New York University School of Law (July 2, 2015) (on file with author).
50. Corporate Europe Observatory, TTIP: Covert Attacks on Democracy and Regulation, 4 (Sept.
2014), http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/ttip_covert_attacks.pdf.
51. See Nicola, supra note 10, at 196–203; see also Meuwese, supra note 11, at 171–74; Bignami &
Resta, supra note 19, at 265–66.
52. For further discussion of these mechanisms see Stewart, supra note 45.
53. See Robert O. Keohane et al., Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 INT. ORG 1, 11
(2009).
54. See Richard B. Stewart, Michelle Ratton & Sanchez Badin, The World Trade Organization:
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extend and strengthen the use of such procedures by parties. In the case of
TTIP, Anne Meuewese points out that RIA procedures will provide
opportunities for public participation in European administrative processes for
55
adoption of regulations that currently are available only on a limited basis.
56
Gray’s proposal for more extensive use of regulatory negotiation could also
broaden opportunities for effective participation in IRC decisionmaking to a
wide range of actors including third-party countries.
Another set of governance issues related to the vertical elements of IRC is
the challenge of achieving horizontal equivalence in the IRC processes across
very different institutional structures and procedures for regulatory
decisionmaking in the participating jurisdictions. As discussed by Meuwese,
significant transatlantic differences in constitutional and political structures
57
pose obstacles to deeper EU–U.S. regulatory cooperation under TTIP. One
important issue is whether IRC undertakings will extend to U.S. states and EU
member states. In the United States, relevant regulatory programs are relatively
highly centralized in the federal government and administrative agencies play a
major role in regulatory decisionmaking under procedures that include notice
and comment on proposed rules and established mechanisms for regulatoryimpact analysis and OMB review. In Europe, relevant regulatory authority is to
a greater extent shared between the EU and the member states. On the other
hand, the U.S. federal government has far less authority over public
procurement by state and local governments than does the EU. Differences in
European and U.S. federal lawmaking procedures must also be confronted
when EU regulatory legislation is adopted by the Council and Parliament on
the proposal of the Commission, which prefers informal modes of consultation
in preparing its proposals. Regulatory impact analyses ensuring public
participation occur only at a later stage and generally do not apply to the
subsequent issuance of regulations. In the United States, notice-and-comment
procedures and regulatory impact analyses do not apply at all to congressional
legislation, but they do generally apply to administrative regulations. The U.S.
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs is a long-established body with
substantial authority to review agency rulemaking. Tasked by President Obama
with promoting IRC, it will serve as the U.S. lead in the TTIP and TPP RCB
processes and it will link with participation by the U.S. sectoral agencies in the
regulatory cooperation process. The EU is still in the process of developing an
institution with equivalent authority and capacity. TPP can be an impetus for
developing such bodies, including in Japan.

Multiple Dimensions of Global Administrative Law, 9 J. INT’L CONST. L. 556 (2011).
55. Meuwese, supra note 11, at 162.
56. Boyden, supra note 8, at 41–47.
57. See id.; see also Richard Parker & Alberto Alemanno, Towards Effective Regulatory
Cooperation under TTIP: A Comparative Overview of the EU and US Legislative and Regulatory
Systems,
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
(2014),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/
tradoc_152466.pdf.
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C. The External Dimension: Impacts on and Relations with Non-Parties and
Their Citizens
When a limited number of jurisdictions participate in an IRC regime, the
regulatory products generated are likely to affect, in both favorable and
unfavorable ways, countries outside the regime and their citizens. The most
obvious concern is with IRC measures that create regulatory or other barriers
to trade with the parties to the IRC scheme. To date, such externalities have not
been a major issue. In most cases, sector-based international organizations that
set regulatory standards are wide open. The WTO has gradually enlarged its
membership to include nearly all nations. Most bilateral IRC activities and
those of the first generation of mega-regionals have not had major adverse
trade impacts on other countries that excited great concern. In some
intergovernmental regulatory networks established by developed countries,
adverse impacts on nonmember developing countries have been an issue,
generally addressed by affording them some form of associate membership and
offering capacity-building assistance.
TTIP and TPP’s ambitious agendas for market liberalization, regulatory
convergence, and investment and intellectual property protections have
generated attention to the regimes’ consequences for non-party countries and
58
their citizens, as well as to their impact on international trade in an economic,
59
regulatory multilateral system. If TTIP enables the United States and the EU
together to effectively determine regulatory standards for much of the globe, it
would represent a dramatic renaissance of transatlantic trade regulatory
hegemony. To the extent that TTIP promotes trade and investment generally,
all countries will benefit, albeit to differing extents. At the same time,
regulatory standards and measures adopted through TTIP could threaten some
countries with competitive disadvantage or otherwise adversely affect them.
TPP poses similar issues, albeit in a less powerful frame. Further, as already
noted, the regulatory measures developed by powerful mega-regionals are
likely to be more broadly disseminated and adopted by other countries,
including developing countries with limited capacities. Accordingly,
nonmember countries and their citizens may have legitimate claims to have
some form of say in these mega-regionals’ decisionmaking.
Addressing nonmember influence in the WTO’s decisionmaking, Howse
notes that the GATT Article XXIV authorizes regional free trade regimes
composed of only some WTO members, and allows them, subject to certain
conditions, to establish preferential trade terms for the FTA participants
58. See Raj Bhala, Trans-Pacific Partnership or Trampling Poor Partners? A Tentative Critical
Review, 11 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 2 (2014); Dan Ciuriak, India’s Response to the Challenge of
the Mega-Regionals, Conference Paper at Changing Global Economic Scenario: Implications for India’s
Trade Policy and Make in India Program (May 12, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2606720; Michelle
Egan, Is TTIP Really that Different? (Feb. 10, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2393755; Peter Yu, TPP
and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, 37 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1129 (2014); Hamilton & Blockmans, supra note
5.
59. Nicola, supra note 10; Howse, supra note 13.
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60

without extending them to all WTO members. Howse argues, however, that
contrary to prevailing assumptions, this carve-out from GATT’s MFN
provisions for mutually preferential tariffs and other border measures for FTA
members does not automatically extend to regulatory measures adopted under
61
the umbrella of a mega-regional. Building on the WTO Appellate Body’s
62
interpretation of GATT Article XX in the U.S.—Shrimp case and provisions
in the Technical Barriers to Trade, Sanitary and Photosanitary Measures, and
Trade in Services Agreements relating to development of international
standards for domestic regulation, Howse argues that parties to FTA regimes
that adopt regulatory standards owe other WTO members duties of regulatory
63
due process. Specifically, he contends that they must either open membership
to other WTO members or afford them opportunities for participation in
regulatory decisionmaking that will ensure fair consideration of their interests,
and, further, they may not impose regulatory requirements on their products
64
and services that place them at unjustified competitive disadvantage. Other
commenters have described an “open architecture” for TTIP that would permit
other countries to join at least certain parts of its regulatory cooperation and
65
other programs; TPP is explicitly open to other countries in the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation. Another option is to negotiate parallel agreements
with additional countries, following the precedent of the U.S. FTA with Chile
after the enactment of NAFTA. If some participation rights are afforded to
other countries, including potentially through regulatory impact assessment or
regulatory negotiation, would they also be available to NGOs, business firms,
and other non-state actors, or would there be two different participation tracks?
Such opportunities for participation also pose the question of whether the
interests and concerns would be addressed through impact assessments or IRC
regulatory agendas, perhaps in connection with harmonizing preferential trade
66
preferences for poorer developing countries. In these ways, mega-regional
IRC decisionmaking could assume a more inclusive perspective.
V
OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO IRC
In the context of mega-regional trade agreements, a number of obstacles to
achieving enhanced regulatory convergence exist at both the international and
60. Howse, supra note 13, at 137–38.
61. Id.at 148.
62. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_
e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm.
63. Id. at 150–51.
64. Id.
65. TTIP’s Geostrategic Implications: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Terrorism, NonProliferation and Trade, 114 Cong. 8 (2015) (statement of Daniel S. Hamilton. Executive Director of
the Center for Transatlantic Relations).
66. See Hamilton & Blockmans, supra note 5, at 8–9.
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domestic levels. First, there must be an alignment of incentives, such that not
only the nations seeking greater regulatory alignment but also the domestic
policymakers within the cooperating nations have an incentive to act. Second,
the optimal type of regulatory cooperation depends upon the underlying
rationale for an existing disparity. For instance, if regulations among the parties
to a mega-regional agreement differ simply because the regulators have
historically failed to coordinate with international counterparts when setting
policy or because certain parties are relying on outdated technical information,
it may prove relatively simple for all parties to the agreement to converge upon
a common regulatory approach. If, on the other hand, the regulations differ
because the populations of the participating nations vary in their risk
preferences or because powerful political actors in different participant nations
favor disparate levels of regulatory stringency, convergence may prove far more
challenging or impossible. Third, the optimal approach to cooperation depends
upon the stage at which coordination takes place. It is generally far simpler to
achieve regulatory convergence when regulators engage with their overseas
counterparts prior to enacting new laws, but this may prove impossible for areas
in which most or all parties to an agreement already have a robust regulatory
framework in place.
The remainder of this part considers innovations designed to overcome each
of these challenges. It explores the incentives for achieving regulatory
convergence at both the international and domestic levels, and it examines how
regulatory cooperation might look at each stage of the policy-making process—
including regulatory agenda-setting, rule formulation, and retrospective review.
It concludes with a few reflections on how these innovations might be deployed
in the context of TTIP and other mega-regional agreements.
A. Incentivizing IRC at the International Level
At the macro level, any voluntary coordinated policymaking process must
involve a non–zero sum interaction that provides at least some benefit to all
participants, lest individual players have a stronger incentive to defect than to
reach an agreement. As Robert Ahdieh has shown, this dynamic may apply in a
larger universe of interactions than previously thought: even in situations
characterized by a clear conflict between the participating parties, the optimal
strategy for all players may still involve reaching some form of agreement rather
67
than perpetuation of the status quo.
Jeffrey Dunoff provides a useful framework for mapping such interactions
among international organizations. He shows that such organizations interact
not only in creating norms that govern the actions of international actors but
also in implementing the norms generated and in exchanging relevant
68
information.
Like Ahdieh, Dunoff recognizes that the type of regulatory

67. Ahdieh, supra note 17, at 88.
68. Dunoff, supra note 16, at 273–93.
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problem encountered will influence the ease with which the participating
organizations can reach some form of agreement. For instance, coordination
problems (wherein mutual gains can be achieved by coalescing around a
common set of norms) generally prove much simpler to resolve than collective
action problems (wherein free riders can gain a competitive advantage by
failure to act) or distributional problems (wherein one participant or group of
69
participants stands to gain much more than others). Dunoff also shows that
certain interactions among international regulatory bodies can prove mutually
beneficial, as when eliminating jurisdictional overlap among a series of
regulatory entities, whereas others can involve the aggrandizement of one entity
70
or an explicit conflict among two or more entities.
In short, the economic calculus undergirding IRC is exceedingly complex,
and one must remain sensitive to the incentives of the international
organizations and nation-states involved when attempting to achieve increased
71
regulatory convergence.
B. Incentivizing IRC at the Domestic Level
Even for instances in which macro-level incentives favoring regulatory
cooperation exist, the decision of whether or not to act ultimately lies with
regulators in individual nation-states, and they may still elect not to proceed if
they lack any personal incentive to do so.
A good illustration of this phenomenon is the recent history of President
Obama’s Executive Order (EO) 13,609, which directs U.S. executive-branch
agencies to avoid unnecessary divergences between domestic regulations and
72
those of key trading partners. The fact that the Obama Administration issued
such an order strongly suggests that it believes that the benefits to the U.S.
economy of IRC outweigh the costs, yet the last three years have not witnessed
vastly expanded engagement between U.S. officials and their overseas
counterparts or rapidly accelerating convergence between U.S. and foreign
73
regulations.
Though this lackluster result may stem from any number of
causes, one compelling explanation is the lack of any clear incentives for U.S.
regulators to seek out opportunities for regulatory cooperation. As the
Administrative Conference of the United States found prior to the issuance of
EO 13,609, regulatory agencies receive no “credit” for economic savings
achieved through eliminating unnecessary regulatory divergences, yet they
would face significant fallout if any public harm were to ensue as a result of
69. Id. at 276–78.
70. Id. at 297–80.
71. Id. at 294–95. In this connection, Dunoff provides a useful framework for cataloging
interactions among international regulatory bodies, characterizing the type of exchange involved and
enumerating historical instances thereof. Id. at 273–93.
72. Exec. Order 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413 § 3 (May 1, 2012).
73. Cheryl Bolen, If U.S.–Canada Cooperation Is a Good Idea, Why Aren’t More Federal Agencies
Doing It?, BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.bna.com
/uscanada-cooperation-good-n17179897089/.
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their efforts to align U.S. regulations with foreign counterparts. Though EO
13,609 now explicitly endorses IRC efforts, it includes no enforcement
75
mechanism and does little to eliminate the aforementioned disincentives.
As this experience teaches, domestic regulators will not pursue IRC unless
they perceive some benefit in doing so. The motivating incentive can take the
form of either a “carrot” or a “stick.” Specifically, domestic law can mandate
that agencies pursue regulatory convergence, or high-ranking political officials
can direct their subordinates to do so. Alternatively, if regulators view IRC as a
mechanism for advancing their regulatory mission, they will pursue it
voluntarily, absent any higher-level legal or political compulsion.
Several articles in this issue seek to erect a framework for incentivizing
domestic regulators to engage with their international counterparts and pursue
regulatory convergence when appropriate. These articles recognize that the
type of cooperation involved will differ depending on the nature of the
regulatory problem. For instance, it will likely prove much easier to achieve
regulatory convergence if the nations involved exhibit a similar level of
76
precaution with respect to the particular activity to be regulated. Equally
importantly, these articles note that the optimal type of cooperation varies
depending on the stage during which regulatory coordination takes place.
Specifically, they recognize at least three distinct stages in the policymaking
process in which regulator-to-regulator cooperation may prove beneficial: (a) in
the pre-regulatory agenda-setting stage, (b) while drafting a regulation, and (c)
when reassessing an existing regulation to determine if it might be modified or
eliminated.
1. Coordinated Agenda-Setting and Stakeholder Input
Ideally, domestic regulators will engage with their overseas counterparts
prior to formulating a new policy: it is far simpler to ensure that unnecessary
74. Michael T. McCarthy, International Regulatory Cooperation, 20 Years Later: Updating ACUS
Recommendation 91-1, REPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 1,
40 (Oct. 19, 2011), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/International-Reg-CooperationReport.pdf.
75. See Reeve T. Bull, Public Participation and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership,
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1262, 1265 (2015).
76. Reeve T. Bull, Answering TTIP’s Critics: Regulatory Cooperation in Risk Assessment and Risk
Management, Essay based upon Remarks made at the George Washington University Regulatory
Studies Center’s Conference, Enhancing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership:
Reducing Regulatory Barriers (Dec. 2, 2014), http://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/answeringttips-critics-regulatory-cooperation-risk-assessment-and-risk-management; see also Reeve T. Bull, Far
From Eroding Regulatory Protections, TTIP’s Cooperative Regime Could Bolster Sound Regulation,
BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES No. 141, at B1 (July 23, 2014). For example, in the
TTIP negotiations, regulation of automobile safety is an especially attractive area for promoting
enhanced convergence insofar as the United States and EU already achieve very similar regulatory
outcomes. Id. at B3. Regulation of genetically modified organisms, by contrast, is a significantly lessattractive area, as EU regulations are currently much stronger than their U.S. counterparts. Jonathan
B. Wiener, Better Regulation in Europe, 59 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 447, 453, 458, 517 (2006) (noting
the ongoing perceptional problems over easing regulations of genetically modified organisms in light of
prior health crises in Europe).
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divergences do not arise in the initial instance than to attempt to eliminate them
after-the-fact, after expectation interests in the perpetuation of the status quo
have emerged. To this point, regulators have had few incentives to work with
foreign counterparts, and many regulatory regimes that might otherwise have
77
proven attractive candidates for harmonization differ for this reason alone.
Gray explores one possible means for providing such incentives, noting that
past IRC efforts have generally been characterized by a lack of high-ranking
political leadership and that domestic regulators have been unwilling to act
78
absent some pressure from above. In this light, Gray urges the United States
and the EU to task officials in the upper echelons of government with
spearheading these efforts, recommending that the Vice President lead the
charge in the United States and that the President of the European Commission
79
do the same in the EU.
As suggested earlier, regulators also might independently seek out
opportunities for IRC if they believe that doing so will advance their agencies’
regulatory missions. This outcome is most likely to be achieved if regulators
consider trade impacts as early in the policy formulation process as possible.
One means by which regulators might achieve this goal is by preparing an RIA
that considers the international trade impacts of a proposed policy prior to
80
formulating a rule.
Another possible approach to achieving enhanced coordination in agendasetting is the creation of a regulatory coordination body that convenes periodic
meetings between regulators in all participating nations. For instance, in 2011,
the United States and Canada created the Regulatory Cooperation Council, an
organization that promotes ongoing interaction between U.S. and Canadian
81
regulators. In the TTIP negotiations, the European Commission has proposed
82
the creation of a similar body to drive transatlantic regulatory cooperation.
The challenges associated with this approach increase exponentially as the
number of participating parties expands, and it has generally proven most
successful in the bilateral context. Nevertheless, the potential payoffs also
increase along with the number of participating parties, making this an
77. Bull, supra note 9, at 74.
78. Gray, supra note 8, at 35–38.
79. Id. at 38–39.
80. EUROPEAN UNION, TEXTUAL PROPOSAL ON REGULATORY COOPERATION IN TTIP, § II.2,
Art. 7.2(c) (May 4, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc_153403.pdf. At
present, this RIA would likely consider trade impacts only on parties to a particular agreement (for
example, the United States and the EU in the case of TTIP), though domestic regulators might
increasingly come to consider impacts on non-parties as this type of analysis evolves. In addition, the
RIA requirement should ideally apply not only to secondary legislation (for example, rules issued by
U.S. administrative agencies or implementing and delegated acts of the EU Commission), but also to
primary legislation (for example, statues issued by the U.S. Congress and EU regulations and
directives), though it may initially prove more feasible to apply it only to the former. See id. at § 1.2(a).
81. Gray, supra note 8, at 40–41.
82. Karl de Gucht, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)—Solving the
Regulatory Puzzle, Address at the Aspen Institute Prague Annual Conference (Oct. 10, 2013),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-801_en.htm.
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especially attractive approach to consider in the context of TTIP and other
mega-regional trade agreements.
A final potential approach to achieving coordinated agenda-setting is
promoting input from international stakeholders during the initial stages of the
policymaking process. In this connection, Gray highlights the experience of U.S.
agencies in the use of negotiated rulemaking, a process by which an agency
convenes an advisory committee with representatives from all major
83
stakeholder interests and tasks this group with formulating a draft rule. A
similar strategy might be deployed in the international context, identifying the
key stakeholder groups in all trading partners and convening a committee to
draft a rule that each participating nation will then introduce via its traditional
rulemaking process. Of course, negotiated rulemaking has enjoyed a mixed
84
record of success in the United States, and the process becomes increasingly
unwieldy as more and more stakeholders representing discrete interest groups
85
join. In this light, formal negotiated rulemaking may prove optimal only in
circumstances characterized by a relatively small number of stakeholder
interests, though promoting collaboration between rule writers and key
stakeholders worldwide in the early stages of the policy-making process may
prove attractive in a much wider array of contexts.
2. Coordinated Rulemaking
Promoting international coordination between policymakers at the agendasetting stage is relatively unobjectionable as a matter of good regulatory
practice: regulators should at least be aware of what their overseas counterparts
are doing when deciding how to proceed. By contrast, promoting convergence
in the final rules adopted is far more contentious given the prerogative of
sovereign states to select the level of regulatory protection they deem optimal.
Indeed, those that have criticized TTIP and other IRC efforts have generally
done so on precisely this basis, arguing that regulatory convergence will erode
86
national sovereignty and will precipitate a regulatory “race to the bottom,”
wherein regulators face strong incentives to adopt the weakest prevailing levels
87
of protection to avoid placing their nations at a competitive disadvantage.
83. See Gray, supra note 8, at 42; see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 563, 565 (2015).
84. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L. J. 1255, 1309–10 (1997); see also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking
Consensus: The (Unfortunate) Waning of Negotiated Rulemaking, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 987, 1004–05
(2008).
85. See 5 U.S.C. § 565(b) (2015) (establishing default limit of twenty-five members on “negotiated
rulemaking committee[s]”); see also Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71
GEO. L.J. 1, 52–53 (1982).
86. See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE
UNION, THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP AND THE PARLIAMENTARY
DIMENSION OF REGULATORY COOPERATION, 8, 30 (2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData
/etudes/etudes/join/2014/433847/EXPO-AFET_ET(2014)433847_EN.pdf; see also Ferdi de Ville,
OBSERVER
(June
14,
2013),
Liberty
and
the
EU–US
Trade
Talks,
EU
https://euobserver.com/economic/120494.
87. See TTIP Puts the EU’s Environmental and Social Policies on the Line, EURACTIV (Jan. 15,
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Ultimately, concerns about a regulatory “race to the bottom” are likely
somewhat overwrought, given that the advocates of enhanced convergence have
been unequivocal in disclaiming any such intentions, that countries also have
incentives to maintain and export their own standards, and that domestic
regulators are intimately involved in the process of IRC and face few incentives
88
to water down their existing regulations. Furthermore, those who raise such
concerns generally erroneously assume that regulatory cooperation consists
solely of harmonizing regulations to achieve a uniform level of protection. Thus,
it is important to distinguish between coordination on technical fact-finding
89
issues and coordination on substantive policy-making issues.
Even if trading partners ultimately decide to adopt disparate rules that
provide for differing levels of regulatory protection, they can still enhance
regulatory decisionmaking and husband scarce regulatory resources by
coordinating on the factual investigations that precede the adoption of a rule.
Regulators often commission various tests, inspections, clinical trials, and other
technical fact-finding endeavors prior to adopting a rule. Sharing these studies
among all trading partners will ensure that each party is acting on the most up90
to-date information available. It will also avoid needless duplication of effort,
thereby providing a strong incentive for regulators to preserve scarce resources
91
by coordinating more closely with trusted overseas counterparts.
By contrast, achieving enhanced convergence in the prevailing levels of
protection is not as unassailably desirable. Indeed, as Wiener and Alemanno
92
show, there are significant benefits associated with regulatory heterogeneity.
First, much as Justice Brandeis recognized with respect to regulatory
93
“experiments” by U.S. states, regulatory divergence can promote learning over
time as regulators compile an empirical basis for assessing which approaches
94
produce optimal outcomes. Second, different populations often exhibit
disparate risk preferences and prefer different trade-offs among competing
2014), http://www.euractiv.com/trade/ttip-puts-eus-environmental-soci-analysis-532724 (articulating the
concerns of ten non-governmental organizations over the perceived impact TTIP would have on
regulations in Europe); see also Sean Donnan & Joshua Chaffin, Green and Consumer Groups Voice
Fears over EU–US Trade Agreement, FIN. TIMES, (Oct. 13, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1b2942a0328f-11e3-b3a7-00144feab7de.html#axzz3gT1AGnaW; Letter from Ctr. for Progressive Reform to Paul
Verkuil,
Chairman,
Admin.
Conf.
of
the
United
States
(Mar.
21,
2013),
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/ACUS_Harmonization_Letter_032113.pdf.
88. Bull, supra note 76, at B1.
89. Bull, supra note 77, at 105; Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 12.
90. See Bull, supra note 77, at 105; McCarthy, supra note 74, at 19–20; Wiener & Alemanno, supra
note 12, at 104, 121; see also Reeve T. Bull & Adam C. Schlosser, Regulatory Science and the TTIP,
PENN PROGRAM ON REGULATION: REGBLOG (July 14, 2014), http://www.regblog.org/2014/07/14/14bull-schlosser-regulatory-science-and-the-ttip/.
91. McCarthy, supra note 74, at 10.
92. See Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 12, at 124–32.
93. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
94. Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 12, at 126–131. Moreover, if IRC does seek regulatory
convergence, this empirical learning process from past policy variation can also help inform where and
how to converge—the choice among several different options for convergence. Id.
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risks, and it is therefore often more efficient to brook some degree of regulatory
95
divergence. As a separate matter, even if achieving increased substantive
regulatory convergence is normatively desirable in theory (for example, if both
U.S. and EU citizens exhibit a similar level of risk tolerance in a certain area), it
may prove practically impossible due to political constraints in participating
nations (for example, powerful industry groups in one party to an agreement
may oppose increasing environmental protections to levels prevailing in other
parties, even if the general public would prefer that level of protection).
Nevertheless, it is important to ensure that, to the greatest extent possible,
the prevailing levels of protection represent the true preferences of the relevant
population rather than the whims of an unelected bureaucrat or rent-seeking
efforts by special interests to insulate themselves from competition. Though this
can never be perfectly achieved in any system that relies upon agency officials
informed by stakeholder input to select the preferred level of regulatory
protection, Bull proposes that agencies convene citizen advisory committees to
assess discrete problems of risk-management and to weigh in on the desired
96
level of protection. The agency would not be bound to follow the committee’s
recommendation, and citizen groups in different nations may ultimately express
a preference for differing levels of protection (such that increased regulatory
convergence may not ensue), but this approach would at least increase the
likelihood that those regulatory divergences that survive truly reflect disparate
risk preferences.
3. Coordinated Retrospective Review
Improved international coordination in the agenda-setting and rule-writing
stages will promote enhanced regulatory convergence moving forward, but
there remains a considerable body of existing regulation that may continue to
pose trade barriers. TTIP seeks to resolve this dilemma by including a series of
mutual recognition agreements, wherein the United States and the EU will
acknowledge that certain existing regulations achieve equivalent results and
therefore provide that compliance with U.S. rules is adequate to satisfy EU
97
requirements and vice versa. In theory, this should result in an optimal level of
regulatory coherence in existing rules, and ongoing coordination efforts should
ensure that additional sources of unnecessary divergence do not arise in future
rules. In reality, the challenges connected with negotiating a FTA, including the
potential political fallout associated with modifying regulatory approaches that
disproportionately benefit domestic producers, will likely ensure that the
98
agreement reached is suboptimal.
As the political climate evolves, however, new opportunities for regulatory

95. Id. at 125–26.
96. Bull, supra note 77, at 119, 123.
97. EUROPEAN UNION, TEXTUAL PROPOSAL ON REGULATORY COOPERATION IN TTIP, supra
note 80, at Art. 10.2.
98. Armanovica & Bendini, supra note 21, at 11–12.
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convergence may arise. In this light, it is important that any agreement include
ongoing channels for coordination not only in the formulation of new policy but
also in the reassessment of existing rules. At present, domestic regulators have
99
few incentives for reevaluating their own regulations, much less comparing
those regulations to foreign approaches to determine if changes are warranted.
If TTIP or any other agreement is to achieve enhanced regulatory cooperation
in the sphere of retrospective review, it must include formal structures designed
to ensure that domestic regulators periodically reassess their existing stock of
rules in light of prevailing practices overseas.
Wiener and Alemanno suggest one possible approach to achieving this goal,
exploring the creation of an international body that would coordinate ongoing
retrospective reviews; evaluate the effectiveness of existing approaches, thereby
exploiting the learning that can arise from regulatory heterogeneity; and
100
promote enhanced regulatory convergence when appropriate. Bull offers
another potential approach, recommending the creation of a “prompt
procedure” whereby private entities could petition agencies to reassess existing
rules in light of prevailing international practices and, when appropriate, modify
those rules to account more fully for the existing state of scientific evidence or
101
for true public risk-preferences.
C. Deploying IRC Innovations in the Context of Mega-regional Agreements
If they are to prove successful, mega-regional agreements must remain
sensitive to the aforementioned obstacles to regulatory cooperation, focusing
on ensuring that proper incentives for regulator-to-regulator coordination exist,
carefully analyzing each component of the regulatory ecosystem to determine
the optimal type of coordination (remaining sensitive to disparate public risk
preferences), and promoting coordination at all stages of the regulatory process.
The primary mechanism for achieving these goals contemplated in the TTIP is a
permanent RCB, which will provide an ongoing forum for both high-level
regulatory officials and lower-level bureaucrats to coordinate at all stages of the
regulatory process.
In theory, the RCB should provide strong incentives for regulatory
cooperation in devising regulatory agendas, undertaking the technical aspects of
policy formulation (for example, conducting joint RIAs), promoting substantive
regulatory convergence, and reassessing existing laws with an eye toward
weeding out unnecessary regulatory divergences and selecting improved policy
designs. In practice, regulators in both the United States and the EU may lack
adequate incentives to design or modify their regulations to promote greater
convergence, especially if their authorizing laws do not explicitly direct them to
do so. Thus, as Gray has suggested, creating an RCB may be inadequate unless
99. Reeve T. Bull, Building a Framework for Governance: Retrospective Review and Rulemaking
Petitions, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 265, 280–81 (2015).
100. Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 12, at 130.
101. Bull, supra note 77, at 120–21.
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high-ranking executive-branch officials in both the EU and United States make
regulatory cooperation a high priority and place appropriate pressure on
domestic regulators. Such a top-down approach might also be supplemented by
a bottom-up approach involving ground-level regulators in the ongoing
discussions. Ideally, regulatory cooperation will become a part of agency culture
over time, as regulators increasingly come to see the process as an opportunity
to draw upon the expertise of overseas partners rather than an additional
procedural hurdle or an effort to dilute their domestic regulatory mission.
The RCB must also remain mindful of the precise nature of regulatory
problems confronted. As the TTIP negotiations to date have shown, certain
sectors wherein the two sides exhibit disparate levels of regulatory protection
(for example, regulation of genetically modified foods) are unlikely candidates
for increased regulatory harmonization in the short term, as any effort to relax
one side’s regulations will be assailed as a “race to the bottom” (or any effort to
ratchet up the other side’s regulations assailed as overregulation). Achieving
substantive regulatory convergence is far more viable in areas characterized by
similar levels of regulatory stringency (for example, automobile safety), but the
RCB can still promote enhanced regulatory coherence by ensuring that both
sides share technical information (for example, results of clinical tests), remain
aware of the activities of their overseas counterparts, and strive to minimize
unnecessary trade irritants. Consequently, lower-level agency officials on both
sides should be closely involved in the RCB process, as they will most likely
understand the complex factual records undergirding agency rules and will
therefore be optimally positioned to identify such smaller-scale opportunities
for enhanced regulatory coherence.
Finally, the RCB should strive to promote regulatory coordination as early
in the policymaking process as possible while recognizing the challenges
inherent in achieving increased convergence in areas already subject to
extensive regulation. Going forward, in areas wherein the EU and the United
States have not yet developed a robust regulatory framework (for example, the
regulation of unmanned aircraft), the RCB should ensure that regulators on
both sides are acting on a common factual record, are aware of the course of
action contemplated by their overseas counterparts, and are striving to achieve
an approach that minimizes trade barriers—even if they ultimately decide to
adopt differing regulations. In areas already characterized by heavy regulation,
political realities may often foreclose substantive convergence insofar as
regulated entities have a vested interest in the perpetuation of the status quo.
Nevertheless, as EU and U.S. regulators come to place a greater emphasis on
retrospective review, the RCB will ensure that the two sides at least exchange
relevant information concerning existing regulations; remain apprised of
regulatory reforms on both sides; and, ideally, identify windows of opportunity
wherein the political dynamics on both sides actually favor modification of
existing laws to achieve greater convergence and more optimal policy
approaches.
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Outside of the TTIP context, these challenges are likely to prove even more
pressing in mega-regional agreements that include regulatory partners at very
different levels of economic development (such as TPP). In these agreements,
achieving enhanced regulatory convergence may prove normatively undesirable
(and, in any event, politically impossible), as developed nations have no interest
in sacrificing hard-won regulatory protections and developing nations are
unwilling to sacrifice economic growth by ratcheting up protections to
developed world levels. In these agreements, partner nations may have to
content themselves with promoting greater information-sharing among
regulators and encouraging universal adoption of good regulatory practices
such as evidence-based decisionmaking, RIA, and stakeholder input. Over time,
substantive regulatory convergence of the type contemplated in TTIP may
become feasible, and implementing such modest reforms will provide a base on
which to build.
VI
CONCLUSION
In summation, the last several years have witnessed a flourishing of
innovations in the IRC context that has allowed regulatory bodies to iron out
unnecessary trade barriers while still maintaining the prerogative of sovereign
states to adopt regulatory policies they deem appropriate. In deploying these
innovations to achieve ever greater regulatory coherence, it is critical for those
shaping future regulatory coordination to pay attention to the incentives of the
key actors. International organizations, sovereign states, and individual
regulatory actors will not act unless they deem the benefits of doing so to
outweigh the costs. It is also imperative that those promoting regulatory
convergence are mindful of the different stages at which coordination may
prove valuable, the benefits associated with retaining some level of regulatory
heterogeneity, and the value of information-sharing even in the absence of
substantive regulatory harmonization. The articles in this issue elucidate a
number of promising avenues for reform while remaining sensitive to the
practical limitations and normative drawbacks of efforts to enhance regulatory
convergence.

